Seeing lots of discussion about whether the U.S. military will go along or push back against orders to confront mass protests. Here’s my take on what other cases and prior research tell us about what might happen. 1/ Let’s start w/ some quick background. In academic parlance, military resistance to orders to repress protests is called “defection” (i.e., mil defects from the political leadership). 2/ Defection takes different forms: soldiers can desert (walk away/lay down weapons) or individuals can “resign in protest”; units can split off or entire military defect. Regardless, tensions in ranks are common, esp. among senior leaders, mid level/junior officers & enlisted/conscripts. 3/ Whether/how defection occurs depends on several factors: First is what mil is being ordered to do: to forcibly disperse protesters or, less controversially, offer logistical/admin support to other security forces. In the U.S., it appears the admin. is calling for Guard to do latter (so far). 4/ Training & operational experience also matter. For ex, the Guard has long history of participating in civil-disturbance missions. Much rarer for active duty and MUCH more controversial if Pentagon orders active duty Marines to assist protest response (as was threatened yesterday). 5/ The military’s “role conceptions,” or ideas of appropriate missions ( “we do or don’t do this”) can affect odds of dissent. In some countries regular mil is involved in domestic missions and this is expected/popular; not so in U.S. Difference btw Guard & active duty also important here. 6/ Crucial too are troops' identification with protesters/lack of social distance btw protesters & soldiers. Ppl don’t want to shoot protesters they identify with. At the same time, training and following orders are inherent in militaries; individuals aren’t taught to weigh their personal views. 7/ Protest character matters, inc. presence of old/young, diverse groups, size, nonviolence. Can affect identification btw soldiers & protesters; makes it harder for pols to demonize protesters (note: these factors create incentives for pols to instigate protest violence; watch for this in U.S.) 8/ Pol leaders’ prior efforts to politicize the military, such as appointing ideological allies, can also foster compliance. Leaders also may compensate institution with funding/new prerogatives to neutralize dissent. Lots of stuff the U.S. admin. has been attempting can be seen in this light. 9/ Historically, militaries w/ strong “corporate” identities worry about losing social esteem & are likely to push back, esp. if they fear damaging the institution’s reputation. FYI, in part for these reasons, I doubt senior leaders in the U.S. military want to be involved in repressing protests. 10/ The tactics of protest leaders can also affect calculations. Efforts to praise the military, fraternize with soldiers, or rhetorically frame the military as “on the people’s side” matter. Very important to stay nonviolent or these messages fail. Food for thought for protest leaders in the U.S. 11/ Finally, in the U.S. the fact that the military has been strongly socialized to norms of civilian control in democracy plays a paradoxical role in protest response. Under normal times, it is essential the military follows civilian orders; indeed this is a prerequisite for democracy. 12/ This ingrained commitment to civilian control though also supports a reflex to follow all orders. Only if illegal or very extreme might you see pushback. For this reason, we may see individual desertion in some cases, but defection at high levels in the U.S. military seems very unlikely. 13/end