1/𧔠Day 2 of 2. Today at 10:30am, High Court in London, Court 1, before Mr Justice Swift, R (Good Law Project, on the application of) v Equality and Human Rights Commission, a rolled-up hearing for judicial review of EHRCâs âinterim updateâ. âšNo live reporting, sorry.
1/𧔠Today at 10:30am, High Court in London, Court 1, before Mr Justice Swift, R (Good Law Project, on the application of) v Equality and Human Rights Commission, a rolled-up hearing for judicial review of EHRCâs âinterim updateâ (Day 1 of 2) âšNo live reporting, sorry.
2/ I missed the first hour of the hearing. I understand Alex Goodman KC addressed the human rights grounds. Tom Cross KC, representing the EHRC, largely argued that the law itself is transphobic, and that the guidance accurately reflected this transphobia. 3/ Crossâs submission, like everyone elseâs, focused largely on toilet provision. He highlighted various justifications for maintaining single-sex toilets, primarily those outlined in paragraph 27 of Schedule 3. 4/ The focus is on workplace toilet provision, so he concentrated on the 1992 regulations and their interaction with the Equality Act. He argues that the 1992 regulations must be understood as referring to âbiological sexâ. 5/ He outlined the claimantsâ case, stating that it is based solely on the protected characteristics of gender reassignment and trans human rights. He says there are two points, direct discrimination comparator, and defence arising from the 1992 Regulations and the Equality Act 2010. 6/ He explains that the 1992 regulations are partly derived from EU/EEC rules but also from preexisting domestic legislation. They provide for separate or single-use toilets at workplaces, and he argues why they must be interpreted as referring to âbiological sexâ. 7/ First, he argues that the Regulations refer to two groups: men and women. These groups are not to be defined by the employer but are determined by the Regulations. He describes the Claimantsâ case as a âsleight of handâ that shifts the decision from his lordship to the employer. 8/ Second, he makes a similar argument to that in Scottish Ministers, asserting that the words âmanâ and âwomanâ are used consistently throughout the Regulations. He says Daniel Stilitz KC, representing the Claimants, also accepted this yesterday. 9/ What differs, however, is that Cross submits that using the same meaning throughout the Regulations implies it must refer to âbiological sexâ. He supports this by extending the discussion beyond toilets to changing rooms and showering facilities. 10/ He argues that words like âreasons of proprietyâ and assumptions about undressing indicate that âbiological sexâ is relevant. He goes into great detail about how the exception allowing mixed-sex hand-washing facilities also supports his argument. 11/ The third point concerns the interaction between the 1992 Regulations and the Equality Act 2010. He notes that paragraphs in Schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010 refer to exemptions based on a requirement of an enactment, as well as provisions for the protection of women. 12/ In relation to the protection of women, he argues that since the Regulations refer to âpregnant women,â they must mean âbiologicalâ women. He says that this means the man and woman in the 1992 Regulations must have the same meaning as the Equality Act. 13/ [At this point, I need to go out of chronological order. The Claimants reply that those exceptions apply only to sex discrimination, not to gender reassignment discrimination, so it is unclear how they support Crossâs argument.] 14/ He then discussed the trans-inclusive policy options an employer might pursue if the claimants are correct that the employer can decide. He says that âself-declarationâ is not feasible. Using lived gender would also create real difficulties in practice as there are no objective criteria. 15/ He also argues that the principle against doubtful penalisation in statutory construction is rebuttable and does not apply here, as trans-inclusive policies are inherently uncertain. 16/ He argues that Scottish Ministers can also apply here by analogy, as the Supreme Court discussed toilets in communal accommodation. If separate groups cannot coherently be maintained there by reference to a âcertificated sexâ, they cannot be maintained here either. 17/ He then repeated the âtrans men/pregnant womenâ point. The claimants relied on section 6 of the Interpretation Act, that gendered language should be read as gender-neutral. This point was mentioned in Scottish Ministers, but the Supreme Court never addressed it directly. 18/ Cross argues that section 6 does not apply because, when both sexes are mentioned in an enactment, the provision is excluded from that presumption. He also notes that a contrary intention could be inferred. 19/ He then returns to the point about comparators. For direct discrimination, he says, for a proper comparison, a trans person has to be comparing to a cis person of the same âbiological sexâ. He relies on the cases of Shamoon, and Macdonald. 20/ Cross justifies this by reference to a material circumstance. âSex would be material when it comes to single-sex space.â So the provision of single-sex space can't be directly discriminatory. 21/ On indirect discrimination, Cross says since indirect discrimination can be justifiable and he offered a justification. He says that compliance with the 1992 Regulations can justify the PCP being applied to toilets segregated on the basis of biological sex. 22/ Cross says the legitimate aim would be to pursue the purpose underlying the 1992 Regulations, namely dignity and privacy. Avoiding inconsistent legislative requirements and maintaining the ability to comply with them are also legitimate aims. 23/ Cross turns to human rights. He says there is no authority for the proposition that it will be a breach of a trans personsâ human rights not to permit them to use a toilet. 24/ He says there is an issue of competing rights, the article 8/14 right of the trans person and the article 8/14 rights of others to use toilets. And he argues there is no consensus within the member states of the Council of Europe. Therefore, there is a wide margin of appreciation. 25/ Afternoon, Cross makes two points about whether Croft remains good law. He says that Croft assumed a change of sex depended on whether a person had completed or undergone a process of gender reassignment, whereas the Supreme Court now states that it does not. 26/ He says, at the time, the GRA was an anticipated legislative regime, and EWCA suggested it might provide an answer to the question of when a change in sex occurs. He says we now know, according to SC, that the GRA does not change sex under the Equality Act either, so: âCroft is a distractionâ. 27/ Tom Cross then criticised âthe so-called trans-inclusive services.â He says that all such services would amount to direct discrimination against cis people of one sex. For example, trans-inclusive female toilets would be directly discriminatory towards cis men. 28/ The judge asked many questions. He first asked why that would be the case. Cross replied that it would amount to sex discrimination because a cis man would be unable to access the facility. 29/ The judge then asked what the less favourable treatment was. Cross said it was necessarily the case that there was less favourable treatment. The judge asked why it was necessarily the case. Cross replied that the service was not provided to the cis man. 30/ The judge said he was struggling with that explanation. Cross says, in his submission, less favourable treatment is found by comparing the positions of men and women under section 29(1). Non-provision is, ipso facto, sufficient and does not require any additional detriment. 31/ The judge asks why the difference in treatment alone would be less favourable treatment when the male and female toilets are side by side, and suggested that segregation by itself is not always less favourable treatment. Cross disagrees, saying segregation is less favourable treatment. 32/ The judge was quite insistent on his example of two rooms next to each other and questioned why there would be less favourable treatment. 33/ Cross suggested that perhaps they are not side by side, and there might be a queue. The judge responded that a queue would be transient and would not amount to direct discrimination. 34/ The judge kept asking the same question. With the court mindful of time constraints, Cross eventually settled on the view that such less favourable treatment would be found âon the factâ. And that it would be, prima facie, a less favourable treatment. 35/ Cross submits, in relation to direct discrimination, Safeway Plc is not analogous here because there is not a different treatment (different dress codes for men and women) but a âmirrored treatmentâ (same requirement to use âbiological sexâ toilets). 36/ Also, the case of Al Hijrah School: direct discrimination must be considered on an individual rather than group basis. Even though boys and girls were separated in the same way as groups, each pupil were treated less favourably, girls were prevented from mixing with boys, and vice versa. 37/ The judge said that none of these cases get Cross to his position. Cross argues that a cis man could claim he is treated less favourably by being denied access to womenâs toilets. The judge returned to the point that the male and female toilets are next to each other, or may be 100 yards away. 38/ The judge suggests that, in such a case (multiple toilets), a service provider might discriminate against a user in the providing a service, contrary to section 29(2) of the Equality Act. Tim Cross says it would instead fall under subsection (1): by refusing to provide a service. 39/ The judge asked again how do the cases of Safeway Plc and Al Hijrah School stand together. Cross says Al Hijrah distinguishes Safeway. He turns to the point on âderogationsâ, the Minister suggests that there is a service test. 40/ [In the Ministerâs âneutralâ response to the case, she examined the EHRC guidance and argued that it effectively introduced a separate âservice testâ alongside the statutory tests in paragraphs 26, 27, and 28 of Schedule 3 to the Equality Act. Cross makes a reply.] 41/ The judge asked what this additional test was said to be. Was it concerned with matters of everyday necessity, such as employing a cleaner of the opposite sex or taking a young son into the ladiesâ toilets. The judge also remarked this question is rather odd, given existence of paragraph 28. 42/ Turning to section 158, the positive action provision that the Good Law Project says could justify having trans-inclusive facilities, Cross argues that section 158 cannot be used in that way. 43/ Cross says section 158 requires a precondition: there must be a disadvantage; and any action taken is about overcoming or minimising that disadvantage. He says that if a cis person brings a discrimination claim, it would focus on their own exclusion, not on the inclusion of the trans person. 44/ Cross says there is a mismatch between the act of exclusion of a cis person and the disadvantage giving rise to the precondition. The judge says it is not limited in that way, and âI donât see a mismatchâ. 45/ The judge suggested that the act in question would be an act that would otherwise be unlawful, and it could cover the general exclusion of others. 46/ For example, in a trans-inclusive female toilet, the claimant could be cis men, but also cis women. A defendant may rely on section 158 it may or may not succeed. The judge says that he doesn't understand the mismatch. 47/ Cross says fully mixed facilities are different from single-sex facilities in which trans people now permitted to enter. The judge says it does not matter because the act could be anything, regardless of protected characteristics or exceptions. 48/ The judge adds that, according to the Supreme Court in the Scottish Ministers case, if a trans person is admitted, the facility would no longer be considered single-sex under Schedule 3. A trans-inclusive facility under section 158 would therefore be mixed under Schedule 3. 49/ Cross turns to his second point, arguing that section 158 would not overcome any issues in providing a trans-inclusive facility, as it undermines the very purpose of maintaining a single-sex space under Schedule 3. 50/ He says that if the aim of trans-inclusivity is also pursued, then the premise in Schedule 3 for establishing proportionality falls apart. He then makes the general observation that the domestic test is the same as the test under the ECHR. 51/ Ground 2. [This is about EHRCâs conduct.] Cross gave an overview of sections 8 and 9 of the Equality Act. He says those are aims. 52/ Cross mainly relies on the witness statements of John Kirkpatrick, Chief Executive of the EHRC. He argues that evidence shows steps taken in service of the aims. It is not for the court to adjudicate the way in which the Commission serves those aims. 53/ Cross says the Commission wants him to emphasise that it rejects the claim that the âinterim updateâ was rushed. He adds that the matter had been under consideration for a long time. 54/ Cross says the EHRC supported the âcertificated sexâ interpretation of the Equality Act before the Supreme Court. The EHRC was unsuccessful, and as a result, they were left with guidance based on that point, which is unlawful. 55/ He says the EHRC cannot revoke the old guidance; it must be the minister who revokes the Codes of Practice. There is incorrect guidance on services that the Commission is powerless to address. âHad we done nothing, [it will give] the impression the extant guidance is correct.â 56/ Cross says the balance is not to do nothing. The claimantsâ assertions bear no resemblance to the reality of the situation. He adds some bullet points in the interim update were mindful of the specific needs of trans people, a fact is largely ignored by the Claimants. 57/ On Ground 3, Tom Cross KC says he does not need to say anything about the human rights ground because, he submits, the proportionality test is baked in the Equality Act 2010. [Comment: He spent hours arguing that the proportionality test can be bypassed or otherwise rendered meaningless.] 58/ And thatâs the EHRCâs case. The judge asked him and Alex Goodman KC to âcrystalliseâ their positions and agree on the specific provisions where any incompatibility with the ECHR might arise, focusing on the locations rather than on whether incompatibility exists. Next, the government minister. 59/ ZoĂ« Leventhal KC represents the Minister for Women and Equalities Bridget Phillipson. She says the government ministerâs interest here is neutral. She would not advance a case on how the claim should be determined. She would focus on refining the essential points of her case and be brief. 60/ The judge says sometimes he needs help and will ask many questions. Leventhal says the first part concerns the Equality Act and relates to the first bullet point of the âinterim updateâ. 61/ She defines the terminology she will use, such as trans people meaning those with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, with or without a GRC. She defines SSS, DSS, and CSS as analytical labels, each of which is further divided into trans-inclusive and trans-exclusive categories. 62/ She defines trans-exclusive as âno exceptionâ and trans-inclusive as allowing all or some trans people in. With that out of the way, she says the interim guidance contains two premises: first, that there would be direct discrimination against a cis person when SSS, DSS, or CSS is provided. 63/ And the second premise, she says, is that the service provider would be relying on Schedule 3 to overcome that direct discrimination claim, but if they were to admit a trans person, they would lose their status under Schedule 3. 64/ She says these premises mean that if a service provider admits a trans woman, they must admit all men. According to her, these premises are encapsulated in the first bullet point of the interim guidance. 65/ The judge asked what she says about the headline [or opening words, âIn workplaces and services that are open to the public where separate single-sex facilities are lawfully provided...â]. 66/ Leventhal says she would rather not deal with the headline directly, but a proper explanation would become apparent as she continue with her planned presentation. 67/ She wishes to make four points: first, whether less favourable treatment in direct discrimination requires a fact-sensitive assessment; second, whether the reason for any exclusion is, in fact, sex; 68/ third, whether a service can make a derogation and remain single-sex; and fourth, a point on section 158. She says she will address points 1 and 3 in detail, and points 2 and 4 more briefly. She points out that Schedule 3 applies only to services and not to the workplace. 69/ Leventhal propose to follow the structure of Mr Crossâs arguments moments ago. Her reply is that section 29 of the Act says you must not discriminate in the provision of services or in the exercise of a public function, and in principle, it does not tell you how a service should be provided. 70/ She said that if a service is single-sex or provided differently to men and women, it may be direct discrimination on the ground of sex. And she said, âI stress, âmayâ.â, and added it depends on what comes out of the ingredients under section 13. 71/ However, she says, even if a single-sex service is prima facie directly discriminatory, whether it is justified depends on a Schedule 3 exception. This aligns it with the section 19 test on indirect discrimination. Based on the same facts, both routes lead to the same outcome and the same test. 72/ Leventhal submits that Cross was wrong to say Schedule 3 is not part of the analysis. The judge counters that, in such a case, the service provider would no longer be purporting to provide a single-sex service. 73/ Leventhal replies that this is indeed the EHRCâs analysis, and that it results in providers having to admit all men. She says the starting point is whether there is any section 13 direct discrimination; if there is not, you do not need to rely on Schedule 3, and that is still fact-dependent. 74/ They returned to the cases of Safeway and Al-Hijrah once again. The judge says that what struck him was that, by evaluating the facts, the court reached very sensible conclusions. But, in principle, different treatment is not necessarily less favourable treatment. 75/ The judge suggests that a difference in outcomes may be a relevant consideration. Leventhal took the court to the case of Dowsett, in which a male prisoner challenged rub-down searches by female prison officers. It was held there was no discrimination. She says this is also fact-sensitive. 76/ She submits that it is difficult to see why a toilet next door, as a dedicated and equivalent facility, would be less favourable as a matter of law, or something that can be assumed or generalised about. This, together with the exceptions, fits into the structure of the discrimination analysis. 77/ Leventhal said the second point was address in the skeleton argument and turned to the third argument. The judge began asking questions. He asked whether, if a person provides a trans-inclusive facility, it would still be a single-sex provision for the purposes of paragraph 27. 78/ Leventhal says that we question whether the EHRCâs analysis, that it is built into the proportionality test that including a trans person in some circumstances would not satisfy the requirements of the Equality Act, is correct. 79/ The judge asks, taking paragraph 27, sub-paragraph 6 as an example: it references objection and presence. If you are allowing a trans woman into the ladiesâ facilities, then that condition is defeated; what needs to be justified here is the separation itself. 80/ Leventhal says she thinks a common ground is that there are varying degrees of need to be considered when including trans people under that paragraph. The judge says that is âtrying to rewrite For Women Scotlandâ, a case all about what sex, man and woman means under the Equality Act. 81/ Leventhal denies that and says, can we just go back to how we get there? She argues that the EHRCâs analysis means that the moment trans-inclusivity is introduced, it effectively ceases to be a CSS once and for all, and you would not need to go to the Schedule 3 justifications at all. 82/ She says one needs to look at how a claim for direct sex discrimination may arise, and that the point about derogation ought to be considered in real-world circumstances. Even the Commission accepted that there will likely be derogation. 83/ She asks rhetorically: if there are derogations, do we simply throw away the entire exception, or treat it as an individual claim? She adds that a binary approach seems to undermine the very purpose of allowing single-sex services. 84/ The judge puts to Leventhal disapprovingly that her argument is simply that a single-sex service open to cis and trans women is still single-sex under Schedule 3. 85/ She replies that this is not quite right; it is about the possibility of relying on the Schedule 3 exceptions and keeping it as a fact-sensitive question, âyou may not be able to, but you may get thereâ. 86/ The judge suggests that her reading would mean it never reaches the question of whether there is direct discrimination, because she maintains that a trans-inclusive CSS is still a single-sex service. Leventhal says âthatâs not what Iâm sayingâ. 87/ The judge suggests that her submission rests on how Schedule 3 is applied. He says that Daniel Stilitz KC submitted yesterday there is nothing in the Equality Act that prevents a trans-inclusive provision. 88/ He suggests that Leventhal is now saying a trans-inclusive provision is still single-sex and is likening that âpersistent derogationâ to letting in cleaners or children. Leventhal says, âNo, my Lord, Iâm not going to advance that point any further.â 89/ The judge says the question is the legality of providing only a âmixed-sex provisionâ under Schedule 3, and whether providing such a toilet to a trans woman would mean it must be open to âall biological menâ. 90/ The judge says, we are ranging far and wide in submissions, but this case is about whether the guidance provided by the EHRC is lawful. He suggests this hearing should not be a symposium. Leventhal accepted that. 91/ Leventhal turns to the case of Authentic Equity Alliance. It is a challenge against the old Code of Practice. She says the claimant [a hate group] in that case argued that that in a single-sex service, every one of the opposite sex could be excluded unless they have a GRC. 92/ She says the court in that case considered it unarguably correct that CSS providers may, in some cases, include trans women without a GRC. The reasoning was that if there could be such a blanket exclusion of trans people, then section 19 could not be properly considered. 93/ Leventhal submits that this is just another way of looking at a fact-sensitive analysis. Whether under an exception, indirect discrimination against cis women, or trans women, a service provider will have to justify excluding people with the protected characteristics of gender reassignment. 94/ Leventhal turns to R (Z) v Hackney. The Supreme Court held that prioritising housing for the Orthodox Jewish community in Hackney was a proportionate means to a legitimate aim under s158. She submits that it supports the legality of trans-inclusive arrangements as a form of positive action. 95/ Leventhal specifically flagged to the court that Croft v Royal Mail was a case about direct discrimination. Indirect discrimination on the basis of the protected characteristic of gender reassignment was not available at the time of Croft. 96/ Leventhal finally makes a submission on the potential indirect discrimination against cis women when a trans-inclusive policy is in place. 97/ She says the question is whether a particular advantage exists, and she points out that, in the case of FDJ, the court found that a case-by-case risk assessment resulted in no indirect discrimination. 98/ And thatâs the government ministerâs case, which they say is neutral and similar to a case presented by an advocate to the court. The next party is the intervener; for health and safety reasons, Iâll move that to a separate thread. Following that, in this thread, is the Claimantâs reply!
1/𧔠Hereâs the separate thread for Sex Mattersâs submission in GLP v EHRC. [Content warning: transphobia] Rupert Paines, who represents the hate group, is speaking from the second row of tables.
99/ Daniel Stilitz KC propose to reply in the same order as Tom Cross KC made his submissions. However, he first addresses the issue of the Good Law Projectâs standing. He cited the logistical difficulties involved in assisting the individual claimant to obtain an anonymity order. 100/ He adds that the Good Law Projectâs support for the trans community demonstrates that it is not merely a busybody. He stresses that standing is intertwined with the merits in this case, noting the importance of holding the EHRC accountable in its discharge of statutory functions. 101/ Stilitz pointed out that there is no challenge to standing from any other parties; the only challenge comes from the EHRC. 102/ He clarifies that the claim falls under both category 1 and category 2 of unlawful guidance in the case of A. He adds that the relevant test is whether the guidance authorises or approves unlawful conduct by others. 103/ He stresses that any statutory power must be exercised pursuant to a statutory duty which makes it unlawful to disregard human rights. He notes that the interim update is statutory in nature, rather than being common-law guidance. 104/ He turns to the meaning of the guidance. He says, the original version of the guidance contains a straightforward mischaracterisation of the 1992 Regulations. There is no requirement to provide gendered toilets. 105/ He also criticises Cross for saying that the Claimants ignored the fourth bullet point individually, which Cross says is mindful of the specific needs of trans people. 106/ He says, read together, the four bullet points mean that if it is not possible to provide individually lockable facilities, trans people are required to use facilities aligned with âbiological sexâ. He submits thatâs a breach of human rights and an egregious form of discrimination. 107/ He turns to Schedule 3, He accepts, it may be invoked to justify both direct and indirect discrimination. However, in either case it must be proportionate means to a legitimate aim. One cannot rely on the kind of hard, categorical rule set out in the first bullet point. It misstates the law. 108/ On the 1992 Regulations, Stilitz says, the key point is the nature of statutory duty it imposes. It is related to the provision of facilities. The manner in which they are managed, âwe say is governed by the Equality Act 2010.â The judge asks what does he mean by manage? 109/ Stilitz says that âmanageâ refers to determining where access to a facility is permitted. He continues that different considerations may arise when deciding whether trans women may use womenâs changing rooms under Regulation 24. 110/ Stilitz says, however such decisions are fact-sensitive and must be made in compliance with both the 1992 Regulations the Equality Act 2010. It is our submission that one does not trump the other. 111/ The judge asks how separate rooms for men and women can be provided without specifying that one is for men and the other is for women; isnât that what management means? Stilitz submits that this is acceptable so long as it remains consistent with the statutory provisions. 112/ The judge asks how the definition issue is to be overcome. Stilitz submits that there are two levels of obligation: first, that facilities must be provided; and second, that the precise way in which those facilities are managed requires a nuanced assessment under the Equality Act. 113/ Stilitz says that even if, contrary to his primary case, the 1992 Regulations are interpreted as referring to âbiological sexâ, an employer who provides sufficient lockable rooms would have discharged the duty. The remaining gendered facilities could then be made trans-inclusive. 114/ He says the Commissionâs guidance makes no allowance for this, and that it is a serious error of law. Thatâs his reply on the 1992 Regulations. 115/ He turns to Crossâs submission regarding paragraph 2 of Schedule 22 to the Equality Act. He says that the pregnancy and maternity regulations, and their counterpart exceptions, can only be relied upon to justify sex discrimination. Not gender reassignment. Or a breach of human rights. 116/ Stilitz then turns to comparators. He says he developed the argument in a somewhat circular way, referring to Croft on the first day, and that a much simpler approach is to look at section 23 of the Equality Act. 117/ He outlined the EHRCâs position and said it is incorrect to assume that, when a trans woman is prevented from using womenâs toilets, the appropriate comparator is a cis man who is also prevented from using those toilets, as this would suggest there is no different or less favourable treatment. 118/ Stilitz gives the example of a trans woman claimant who transitioned long ago, has undergone surgery or hormone treatment, and has lived as a woman for decade. She is told she may no longer use the womenâs toilets. 119/ Stilitz asks rhetorically, under paragraph 23, who is the appropriate comparator? He says the obvious comparator is a âbiological womanâ. The only difference between the claimant and the comparator is her protected characteristics of gender reassignment. 120/ The judge asks whether this runs up against the Supreme Courtâs decision in Scottish Ministers regarding sex. Stilitz says that a personâs sex under the Equality Act is a separate question from who is the correct comparator. 121/ The judge observes that, in such cases, a direct discrimination claim cannot fail, as she will always be compared with a cis woman who has access to the toilets. Stilitz agrees and adds this applies only in the employment context, as service provision is subject to the Schedule 3 exceptions. 122/ Stilitz also noted that the only paragraph in Scottish Ministers dealing with comparators relied on Croft, and that it is cited with approval. 123/ Stilitz addressed Crossâs argument that providing only mixed-sex toilets may be direct discrimination against women. He said the EHRC had given no explanation of how this would be less favourable treatment. 124/ He also addressed the âmismatchâ between positive action and discrimination, stating that the positive action in question would be the provision of trans-inclusive toilets. 125/ On ground 2, he said he does not accept that sections 8 and 9 of the Equality Act merely impose a target duty. The judge noted that no one had suggested this, so the point was not pursued. 126/ Stilitz addressed briefly the hate group intervenerâs evidence. He says Maya Forstaterâs evidence is selective, anecdotal and disputed; Michelle Shipworthâs evidence is controversial and disputed. 127/ Stilitz says Professor Sally Hines and also the EHRCâs own research indicates that vast majority of women are comfortable with trans women in toilets. The judge requests a 4-page summary of the British Standards regarding toilets. This concludes Stilitzâs reply. 128/ Finally, the judge says the court will adjourn and reserve judgment. He then explains what this entails and outlines the arrangements for handing down the judgment, giving no indication of how long it may take, [though it is expected to be before Christmas.] [End of thread.]