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The Institute for Fiscal Studies

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NEW: The Chancellor almost certainly has a fiscal repair job on her hands at next month’s Budget.

But doing the bare minimum risks another fiscal groundhog day next year.

🧵 THREAD on our new IFS Green Budget's findings on the UK's economic outlook and fiscal situation:

The UK is by no means a fiscal outlier internationally.

We are ‘middle of the pack’ on the scale of the deficit, and UK government borrowing is projected to fall by more than in other large economies.

Chart shows general government fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in the UK and comparator countries (positive values denote a budget surplus). Title states: "In terms of borrowing, the UK is ‘middle of the pack’ among advanced economies."

But the UK’s stock of government debt has tripled since the start of the century. In the process, the UK has gone from having the 21st-largest debt among 37 advanced economies to having the 5th-largest.

Chart shows government net debt as a percentage of national income. Title states: "UK government debt has tripled since 2000, a faster rate of growth than most advanced economies."

Much-elevated debt combined with higher government borrowing costs has pushed up debt interest spending.

It is forecast to be £111bn this year, £64bn higher than forecast just three years ago. £64bn is roughly equal to the day-to-day core schools budget.

Chart shows debt interest spending as a percentage of national income. Title states: "Debt interest spending is £64 billion higher than expected three years ago – an increase roughly the equivalent of the core schools budget."

Combined spending on the state pension, other pensioner benefits and debt interest is expected to reach almost 10% of GDP by 2029–30.

The fact that it is these areas driving overall spending upwards makes deliverable and credible spending cuts harder to find.

Chart shows spending on the state pension, other pensioner benefits and debt interest as a percentage of GDP. Title states: "Spending on the state pension, other pensioner benefits and debt interest spending combined are set to equal almost 10% of GDP by 2029–30."

UK inflation is above target and higher than elsewhere – one reason why interest rates are higher.

Barclays judges that around 0.2ppts of inflation is from April’s employer NICs rise; a larger chunk is from energy and food prices, other tax changes, and regulated prices.

Chart shows path for CPI inflation, and estimated path without impact of tax changes at October 2024 Budget or administered price increases. Title states: "CPI inflation is running at close to double the Bank of England’s target rate of 2%, and is expected to rise further."

The @OBR_uk’s revised productivity forecast at the Budget will be a key determinant of the fiscal outlook.

Productivity growth has repeatedly fallen short of the OBR’s forecasts, and a downgrade is now widely expected.

Chart shows productivity: out-turn and successive OBR forecasts. Title states: "The OBR’s productivity forecasts have proved too optimistic since 2010."

In addition, @OBR_uk’s forecasts for economic growth over this parliament are more optimistic than those from other forecasters.

Barclays forecasts expect annual real GDP growth to average 1.4% from 2026 onwards, lower than the OBR’s average of 1.8%.

Chart shows annual real GDP growth (% year on year) from different forecasters. Title states: "The OBR’s forecasts for growth are more optimistic than other forecasts."

Under Barclays central economic scenario, forecast borrowing in 2029–30 would be £22bn higher than was expected in March.

The Chancellor would need at least £12bn of savings to avoid borrowing for day-to-day spending in that year, as prescribed by her borrowing rule.

Chart shows current budget surplus as a percentage of national income. Title states: "Forecast borrowing in 2029–30 – the target year of the fiscal rules – could be £22 billion higher than was expected in March."

Much of this additional borrowing comes from known changes: U-turns and higher debt interest cost over £10bn.

A downgrade to the growth forecast would make this worse: as a rule of thumb, each 0.1 percentage point downgrade might increase borrowing by some £7bn in 2029–30.

Chart shows changes to forecast current budget surplus in 2029–30 between OBR March 2025 forecast and Barclays/IFS scenario. Title states: "Higher forecast borrowing is a result of policy U-turns, higher government borrowing costs, and lower growth forecasts."

But just meeting the borrowing fiscal rule might not be enough. The Chancellor’s other fiscal rule is to have debt falling as a share of GDP in 2029–30: lower forecast growth in this scenario would force £17 billion of fiscal tightening to meet it.

Chart shows public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) as a percentage of national income. Title states: "The government could be on track to miss their debt rule by more than their borrowing rule – meeting it would require further tax rises or spending cuts."

Until 2022, it was very rare to leave less than 0.5% of GDP in headroom against the government’s fiscal rule.

Now this has become commonplace under the last two Chancellors. This undermines the government’s stated objective of policy stability.

Chart shows headroom against fiscal rule of the day, percentage of GDP. Title states: "Since 2022, margins against fiscal rules have been ultra-narrow: triple those margins were the norm for previous Chancellors."

If the Chancellor wants to avoid a similar fiscal bind next time, a larger fiscal consolidation i.e. larger 'headroom' would be the most straightforward route.

She will want to ensure that any planned fiscal consolidation is credible: the bond markets will be watching.

“A key challenge is ensuring that fiscal groundhog day doesn’t become a twice-yearly ritual.”

📗 Read our Green Budget 2025 report, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays, here: ifs.org.uk/...

🖥️ Join our event at 9:30 here: ifs.org.uk/...

Quote from IFS Director Helen Miller: "A key challenge is ensuring that fiscal groundhog day doesn’t become a twice-yearly ritual. There is a strong case for the Chancellor to build more headroom against her fiscal rules. That wouldn’t be costless – but nor is limping from one forecast to the next under constant speculation that policy will be tightened again."