This is a poor take that suggests Owen Jones doesn't know much about Russia in the 1990s, including Russia-US or wider Russia-West relations in the 1990s. By giving only one part of the story, he is repeating the Russian political elite's self-serving line that it was all the West's fault. Long 🧵
The West helped create Vladimir Putin. A senior Western diplomat warned in 1994 where capitalist 'shock therapy' would take Russia. They ignored him - and ended his diplomatic career.
The US-led West was heavily involved in Russian "shock therapy" after the collapse of the USSR. Western, particularly US, economists dispensed advice on creating a new market economy. The international financial institutions (IFIs) handed over loans conditional on harsh reforms. It was a disaster for most ordinary Russians and failed to create the kind of economy it was supposed to. It created a backlash that favoured the Russian far right party the wildly mis-named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in elections in late 1993. In response, Strobe Talbott (Bill Clinton's Russia advisor) famously said that there needed to be "less shock and more therapy" - a line that infuriated the Russian officials who felt they had been following US advice and were now being hung out to dry. By the way, the idea that it was impossible for anyone in the US government to criticise shock therapy in 1994 - which is what Owen Jones seems to be suggesting - is simply not true. Here's the New York Times reporting of Strobe Talbott's comments on 21 December 1993:
The infamous 1990s voucher privatisation scheme, designed to privatise the former Soviet businesses in Russia and give ordinary people a stake in the process, turbo-charged the emergence of the oligarchs. The failure to look to closely at how bilateral, plus IMF, EBRD, and World Bank loans were being spent - to enforce conditionality - meant that $ billions intended to transform the Russian economy disappeared into private bank accounts with few questions asked. At the same time as the US and others were promoting poor ideas and not asking questions about vanishing aid money, they were often being intensely patronising to their Russian counterparts who were struggling with horrifyingly difficult problems. There are debates about why the US, the UK and others made such huge mistakes in promoting and partly funding Russia's disastrous economic reform in the 90s. Part of it, I think, was that no-one had ever tried to do anything like this on this scale before. A major factor was that much of the Western involvement in Russian economic reform was driven by political, not economic objectives. The Clinton administration was clear that rapid privatisation was necessary to prevent the return of communism. This is Larry Summers in July 1993:
The idea that Yeltsin needed to be supported at all costs, as the only democratic alternative to the communists and far right nationalists, explained the determination not to look too closely at where the $ billions in Western aid were going. The choice not to enforce aid conditionality - to not ask where the money had gone, even as $ millions more was being handed over to the Yeltsin government - was very visible in the run up to the 1996 Russian presidential election, which the West desperately wanted Yeltsin to win. So, did Western (particularly US) ideology, paternalism, and the prioritising of political objectives over effective economic reform contribute to Russia's economic and political disaster in the 90s? Yes. But not nearly as much as Russians contributed to it. Russian economic reform in the 1990s was a disaster because of the mismanagement of the Russian government, the failure of the Yeltsin government to create and enforce an effective legal framework, and staggering levels of corruption. One of the reasons why life was so extremely hard for many ordinary Russians in the 90s was that much of the Soviet-era social infrastructure had vanished and couldn't be replaced because the Russian state was appallingly bad at collecting taxes. Rampant corruption drained the Russian state and was disastrous for economic transition. Westerners who tried to invest often had their money stolen; Russian courts generally sided with the Russians who had taken it. Yeltsin and his circle, who enriched themselves so much while ordinary people suffered, were loathed by Russians the end of the 1990s. But Yeltsin and those around him tried to blame the West for the effects of their mismanagement and corruption. When the 1998 financial crisis hit Russia, it exposed the full extent of the failure to reform. The Yeltsin government was desperate for the West and the IFIs to bail them out. They were reluctant to do that, because it was clear just how little had been done with previous aid. The IFIs did give Russia aid in 1998, but not nearly as much as the Russian government wanted, and with stricter conditions than before. These things enraged the Yeltsin administration. A conspiracy theory took hold, that the US had imposed policies on Russia that were designed to destroy the Russian economy. The 1998 bailout was deliberately inadequate to further harm, and to humiliate, Russia. This is a conspiracy theory that carried on long after the 1990s were over. I've heard it from Russian students in class. Like other Russian conspiracy theories about the West bringing down Russia, it's very convenient for Putin and for Russian society in general. The idea that Russia is a great power, with a special place in the world by virtue of its unique civilisation, is absolutely central to Russian national identity. It's an ideology that Putin and those around him have pushed relentlessly. But, for Russian imperialists and those nostalgic for the great Soviet past, like Putin, Russia is also a state that was defeated and then humiliated in the 1990s and which has never been able to recover its true, pre-ordained place in the world. The recovery of the Russian economy in the 00s was not a result of successful reform but, in large part, of global energy prices. For years in the 00s and 2010s the Russian government spoke about the need for economic reform but did very little. Corruption is still an enormous problem. The oligarchs continue to exist. Whose fault is all that? Well, clearly it can't be the fault of the Russian government and the Russian political and economic elites. If Russia hasn't fulfilled its historic destiny, that can't be the fault of the Russians - let alone anything to do with Putin and those around him. Instead, it must be the result of a great conspiracy against Russia. It must be the fault of the West. This formula conveniently explains everything that has gone wrong with Russia and it's great power ambitions for 35 years. Economic disaster? US-led conspiracy to bring Russia down. Failure of Russia to retain a sphere of influence? US-led conspiracy against Russia. By blaming the West for Russia's inability to emerge as the great power it is destined to be, the Kremlin shifts the blame for the Russian government's own failures while also creating an enemy that legitimates it and rationalises ever more control over Russian society. "It's all the West's fault" has been the Russian political elite's indispensable get out of jail free card for 30 years. It allows them to acknowledge that things have gone wrong while taking zero responsibility. If you tell only part of the story of what happened to the Russian economy in the 1990s, you are helping Putin continue to justify what he does to Russians, to Ukrainians, and to the rest of Europe.