A new podcast with military analyst @michaelkofman.bsky.social is out on Militarnyi. Kofman regularly visits Ukraine and conducts field research, making his assessments particularly valuable.
Here are the key takeaways from the conversation. 🧵
The turning point came in autumn 2025, when Russia's ground forces exhausted their way of fighting.
2026 has been Ukraine's best year militarily since 2023 – and Russia's worst.
Russia recruits 33,000–35,000 soldiers a month, but over 90% simply replace losses.
Despite recruiting over 400,000 annually since 2023, its army is no longer growing meaningfully.
The chances of a major operational breakthrough are "close to zero."
Since 2024, Ukraine has been shifting personnel and resources from mechanized units to drone warfare.
This is considered one of Ukraine's best military decisions of the entire war.
Desertion and unauthorized absences remain a serious problem in Ukraine's military, although more soldiers are now returning.
But Ukraine has enough people. The real problem is how its forces are organized, generated and commanded.
Ukraine's transition to a corps-based command structure is absolutely the right decision.
The previous tactical groupings were essentially "virtual command layers" that created unnecessary obstacles rather than improving battlefield coordination.
With Drapatyi's arrival, Ukraine's General Staff began changing its command style.
Instead of micromanaging commanders, it increasingly delegates authority and supports their decisions.
This represents a major improvement in military leadership.
Russia's plan to encircle the remaining Ukrainian-held urban agglomeration in Donbas has failed.
The northern salient near Lyman was eliminated during Operation Vivaldi, while the southern pincer was stopped near Dobropillia last year.
Russia's campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure remains Ukraine's biggest challenge.
But history shows that strategic bombing rarely breaks a country's political will when its army continues to hold the front.
The US war with Iran is cited as an example.
Russia isn't running out of money yet.
But since spring, even its financial elite has publicly acknowledged that the war is unsustainable and has exceeded its planned timeline.
Russia's ability to maintain the current pace of fighting could (not will) be threatened in 2027.
Full episode