1.4K
Dmitry Grozoubinski
Dmitry Grozoubinski

1/ This Yanis Varoufakis screed made me so angry the only way I can salvage my day is to go through it line by line as catharsis. You are welcome to come on the journey toward my aneurism with me. An angry h/t to @sianushka.bsky.social for bringing this into my life. unherd.com

Why I went to Moscow

unherd.com

2/ Starting strong by positioning ending the war as a choice for Europe to make. Putin just wanted a 'sensible security pact', that's why he enshrined Russian ownership of four regions of Ukraine into the Russian constitution and tried to take Kyiv. Just a smol, sensible bean.

3/ So much to unpack here. First, the 'forever war' in this case is entirely Putin's choice. He could declare 'victory' or 'mission accomplished' or nothing at all and just withdraw to Russia's borders at literally any time. Macron isn't dragooning Russian troops into attacks on Kherson.

4/ The sanctions bit of this is also very dumb. It assumes Europeans thought sanctions would, for pretty much the first time in human history, topple a regime. Not signal opposition (which they did) Not slow down Russia's economy (which they did) Not starve Russia's warmachine (which they did).

5/ Yeah dude, Russia's economy is going great guns. They're crushing it. This is the kind of economic inisght and analysis that made Yanis such an invaluable asset to Greece. Is monthly inflation of 6% and a 15% interest rate good, Yanis? Military Keynsianism lmao.

6/ The strategy has been give Ukraine support so it can keep killing Russians until the price becomes unsustainable. It's not a perfect plan, and it's one both Europe and the US have been interrmitent on executing, but it's clearly working. Don't take my word for it, read Russian mil-bloggers.

7/ *"What the fuck are you talking about, Jesse?" meme* So a (US created) energy crisis in April of 2026 will compel the EU to abandon Ukraine and accept a peace deal that will see US owned pipelines that won't be finished for years eventually sell it Russian gas? Are you fucking high buddy?

8/ Every analyst who actually knows what they're talking about has been clear that while higher oil/gas prices as a result of the Strait crisis offer a reprieve for Russia, they don't solve any of their problems. It's a bandaid, not a prosthetic. Also, Ukrainian drones are working on it 😘.

9/ The 'hitler' stuff makes me really angry, because as always it positions the real problem not as the bad people doing bad things, but as the tone and linguistic choices of those condemning them. It's the "sure misogyny is bad, but feminists are so LOUD" of geopolotics. Fuck off Yanis.

10/ This just gets repetitive. It presumes Europe has a "peace" button it can push whenever but is too scared to for optics reasons. It presumes Putin is telling the truth that his sole concern is Russia's security, which even Putin's speeches make clear is not the point.

11/ First, lmao at the idea that Putin needs actual concessions to sell the war to his domestic constituency. He could declare tomorrow that the war is a crushing victory and that they've liberated brother Russians from the pedo-gays, and everyone would cheer. He just lies and invents things!

12/ Second, and setting aside the idea that big countries should get to veto the foreign policy choices of their smaller neighbours because something something Mearsheimer Spheres of Influence Realism... ... there were no NATO troops in Ukraine and none likely! Also, it's a DEFENSIVE alliance.

13/ Thirdly, this again simply ignores the literally hours of rambling speeches Putin has given about how Ukraine is a part of Russia, how it's not a real country, how it was stolen from Moscow etc. It cherry picks one of the 7 justifications Putin has offered for war.

14/ Fourthly, is the problem that NATO forces in Ukraine would be too strong for Russia to tolerate, or too weak and easily swept aside because it's all Starmer can muster? The goal of a peacekeeping force would be as a tripwire, so an attack is unthinkable. Children get this.

15/ I legitimately don't even know what he's on about here. The reason anyone is talking about Franco-British-German troops as peacekeepers or deal garauntors is that no one else is eager or willing. Because they don't trust Putin. Perhaps Yanis should consider why, or just ask Prigozhin.

16/ "Creative with issues of sovereignty and governance" is the sort of sentence you only ever seen written about other people's countries. Also, we tried that. It was Minsk I (Pt. 3) and Minsk II (Pt. 4). Somehow, it didn't help. Funny that.

17/ Yeah dude, absolutely vital we rebuild ties with the mighty and highly influential people in Russia's civil society. Real power centres, there. God, just say you missed doing cocaine off expensive sex workers in Moscow nightclubs on the Kremlin's dime and save us this sanctimonious drivel.

18/ I suppose if we do want to rebuild a sense of connection with Russia then sending Yanis to show them we have elites just as stupid, vanal, and easily duped by Russian propoganda as they do is a good opening gambit. Credit where credits due, more that unites than divides, etc.

19/ Jesus Christ how am I still barely half way through this? What day is it? Where am I? Send help.

20/ Russia already once garaunteed the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Budapest Memorandum, so that's worthless. A European security garauntee for Ukraine is called Ukraine joining NATO, the EU, or both. Putin pretty vehemently opposes that. I wonder why?

21/ So, the UK and France have to give up their nuclear weapons... and I guess Russia does too? Also, 300km?!? Kyiv is less than 300km even from the actual pre-2014 Russian border! Where is Ukraine supposed to pull its troops back to Yanis, Dover?

22/ I mean, sure, fine. A lot of those homes are now ruins because Russian military doctrine is to absolutely flatten villages with waves of artillery and drone strikes and advance once all cover is atomized but, ok. Also, presumably under Yanis-plan, a lot of those homes would be in Russia now?!

23/ This conflates a genuine secretarian conflict in Northern-Ireland with a Russian proxy force in Donbas led by literal FSB officers. The problem isn't "can the people in Donbas get along" and never has been. They were getting along fine until Igor Girkin came along.

24/ Hahaha, yeah dude. Get that bag!

25/ Yeah dude, I'm sure Putin can't wait to frog march half his officer corps in front of a UN panel and have them be judged for Bucha and about 50,000 other atrocities. Real insight into the deep Russian soul you gained grinding on 19 year olds at the club.

26/ How about a European Comprehensive Security Agenda whereby a criminal petro-state in the region can't threaten, subvert and invade neighbours with no consequences? How about one where Europe's significant military budgets translate into effective deterrence? No? Just appeasement? Ok. Cool.

27/ Oh, well if Russian Civil Society is behind the plan then it definitely has legs. Maybe we could get North Korean independent media behind it too, and really leave the Kremlin no option? Though I mean, it gives Putin most of what he wants so..?

28/ Also, can I just say how incredible it is to write like 10,000 words on the Russia/Ukraine war and never offer any kind of opinion on which of the contested territories each side gets to keep? You know, the central point of contention in every negotiation? How do you handwave that?!? 29/ Jesus christ. THE COLLEGE STUDENTS YOU PARTY WITH DURING KREMLIN SANCTIONED GLORY TOURS TO MOSCOW AND ST. PETER ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF RUSSIAN POLICY ANY MORE THAN A UC BURKLEY'S LGBTQIA2S+ SOCIALIST COOP YOGA CIRCLE IS A PROXY FOR MAGA OR THE TRUMP WHITE HOUSE. !@#!@%!@ $!@#!@%$ !@#%@!

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Since the invasion of Ukraine, Europe has had only two options regarding its stance toward Russia: forever war or offering Russia a sensible peace and security pact.
Europe’s leaders chose forever war. They labelled Vladimir Putin the new Hitler. Once they had done so, it was impossible to envision any agreement with him. Like Donald Trump, who had hoped that shock-and-awe over Tehran would trigger an internal coup or rebellion that might topple the Islamic Republic, European leaders placed their bets on the prospect that the combination of tough sanctions on Russia and arms for Ukraine would topple Putin. It didn’t.
Europe’s leaders chose forever war. They labelled Vladimir Putin the new Hitler. Once they had done so, it was impossible to envision any agreement with him. Like Donald Trump, who had hoped that shock-and-awe over Tehran would trigger an internal coup or rebellion that might topple the Islamic Republic, European leaders placed their bets on the prospect that the combination of tough sanctions on Russia and arms for Ukraine would topple Putin. It didn’t.
Four years of sanctions and war have achieved the opposite result. They rebalanced Russia’s current account, energised factories that lay dormant since the end of the Soviet Union, transferred foreign-owned companies to Russian oligarchs and kept oligarchic profits within Russia. Thus, the sanctions combined with military Keynesianism to stabilise Putin’s reign. Meanwhile, despite its impressive resistance on the battlefields, Ukraine’s economy is being steadily weakened while Europe is trapped in a geostrategic conundrum of its own making and the new oil crisis engineered by Israel and the United States.
Lacking both a strategy for winning the war and an interest in suing for peace, European leaders have ended up struggling to find increasingly scarce means of prolonging the war a little more in the vain hope that some miracle may deliver them from their strategic void or that their tenure will have ended by the time their folly has been exposed for all to see. Meanwhile, the bodies pile up in Ukraine’s killing fields and Europe’s social economies are haemorrhaging.
With Europe’s strategic defeat a near certainty, there are only two ways it will play out. One is that President Trump puts on the table a take-it-or-leave-it peace plan that President Zelensky and the European Union must accept, or else the United States ceases to share intelligence and to sell weapons to the Europeans to pass on to Ukraine. Exhausted by their energy crisis, fiscally stressed, and unable even to maintain the current level of support to Ukraine, German, Italian and French politicians will acquiesce to Trump’s plan. A Europe that has left them high and dry will leave Ukrainians feeling abandoned, unsafe and disillusioned. The ignominy will be complete when Russian natural gas begins to flow again into Germany, Italy and the rest of the European Union through pipelines that are, now, partly US-owned, with Washington retaining a share of the proceeds, while the European Union foots Ukraine’s reconstruction costs in their entirety.
The other possibility, one that will obtain if Donald Trump remains distracted for the rest of his tenure by his Iran war folly, is even less appetising. Russia’s juggernaut, boosted by the windfall from high oil and gas prices, ekes out the rest of the Donbas slowly, painfully, devouring lives with a ruthless, mechanical precision until, at a moment of his choosing, Vladimir Putin declares victory and announces a unilateral ceasefire. Then, any leverage the European Union might have had to shape a peace and security agenda for its neighbourhood withers to nothing.
Oil refinery in flames. Slava.
What if Europe were to ditch forever war in favour of its second option, the path never taken? What if it were to offer Russia a sensible peace and security pact that extends beyond settling the Ukraine war? Just posing the question will, undoubtedly, trigger howls of betrayal, charges of appeasing the new Hitler, accusations of reciting Moscow’s speaking points. These are the natural responses of having made, initially, the forever war choice which, as already argued, leads to a bitter betrayal of Ukraine and a miserable outcome for Europe.
What if Europe were to ditch forever war in favour of its second option, the path never taken? What if it were to offer Russia a sensible peace and security pact that extends beyond settling the Ukraine war? Just posing the question will, undoubtedly, trigger howls of betrayal, charges of appeasing the new Hitler, accusations of reciting Moscow’s speaking points. These are the natural responses of having made, initially, the forever war choice which, as already argued, leads to a bitter betrayal of Ukraine and a miserable outcome for Europe.
To envisage this second option, a European offer of a peace and security pact, there are three prerequisites. First, the abandonment of the delusion that the offered pact should contain nothing that Putin can present as a victory. All pacts, agreements, peace deals, etc., must offer each signatory things they can present as great gains to their own constituency. Is there something that Putin can present to the Russians as worthy of their sacrifices during this awful war which Europe, including Ukraine, can live with? I think so. How about that, in the same way the United States can say an emphatic “No!” to the right of Mexico to deploy Chinese weaponry in Tijuana, Russia also has the right to seek security by demanding, as it has done for three decades, that Nato stay out of Georgia and Ukraine? A provision in the proposed European Peace and Security Pact that recognises this Russian concern is not just a particularly small price to pay but also one that Europe should desire, in view of the dangerous tensions that a face-off between Russian and Nato troops within a postwar Ukraine, or indeed in Georgia, would generate.
To envisage this second option, a European offer of a peace and security pact, there are three prerequisites. First, the abandonment of the delusion that the offered pact should contain nothing that Putin can present as a victory. All pacts, agreements, peace deals, etc., must offer each signatory things they can present as great gains to their own constituency. Is there something that Putin can present to the Russians as worthy of their sacrifices during this awful war which Europe, including Ukraine, can live with? I think so. How about that, in the same way the United States can say an emphatic “No!” to the right of Mexico to deploy Chinese weaponry in Tijuana, Russia also has the right to seek security by demanding, as it has done for three decades, that Nato stay out of Georgia and Ukraine? A provision in the proposed European Peace and Security Pact that recognises this Russian concern is not just a particularly small price to pay but also one that Europe should desire, in view of the dangerous tensions that a face-off between Russian and Nato troops within a postwar Ukraine, or indeed in Georgia, would generate.
To envisage this second option, a European offer of a peace and security pact, there are three prerequisites. First, the abandonment of the delusion that the offered pact should contain nothing that Putin can present as a victory. All pacts, agreements, peace deals, etc., must offer each signatory things they can present as great gains to their own constituency. Is there something that Putin can present to the Russians as worthy of their sacrifices during this awful war which Europe, including Ukraine, can live with? I think so. How about that, in the same way the United States can say an emphatic “No!” to the right of Mexico to deploy Chinese weaponry in Tijuana, Russia also has the right to seek security by demanding, as it has done for three decades, that Nato stay out of Georgia and Ukraine? A provision in the proposed European Peace and Security Pact that recognises this Russian concern is not just a particularly small price to pay but also one that Europe should desire, in view of the dangerous tensions that a face-off between Russian and Nato troops within a postwar Ukraine, or indeed in Georgia, would generate.
To envisage this second option, a European offer of a peace and security pact, there are three prerequisites. First, the abandonment of the delusion that the offered pact should contain nothing that Putin can present as a victory. All pacts, agreements, peace deals, etc., must offer each signatory things they can present as great gains to their own constituency. Is there something that Putin can present to the Russians as worthy of their sacrifices during this awful war which Europe, including Ukraine, can live with? I think so. How about that, in the same way the United States can say an emphatic “No!” to the right of Mexico to deploy Chinese weaponry in Tijuana, Russia also has the right to seek security by demanding, as it has done for three decades, that Nato stay out of Georgia and Ukraine? A provision in the proposed European Peace and Security Pact that recognises this Russian concern is not just a particularly small price to pay but also one that Europe should desire, in view of the dangerous tensions that a face-off between Russian and Nato troops within a postwar Ukraine, or indeed in Georgia, would generate.
The second prerequisite for a genuine peace and security pact is the rejection of the notion that it will have to involve an Anglo-European “coalition of the willing”; that is an army of British, German, French soldiers facing off their Russian counterparts along whatever line of control is agreed to. To insist on such an army is to state that Europe is not even attempting a genuine détente, assuming it to be impossible. The United States did exactly that on the Korean peninsula, leaving behind an ironclad, nuclear armed, huge army to police an impenetrable line of control. Europe cannot and should not want to do likewise in Ukraine. The best Keir Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” can deliver is a sad outfit facing the fate of UN peacekeepers in South Lebanon. It takes no more than a few moments of clarity to recognise that a functional peace and security pact must involve full de-militarisation of the contested territory and its surrounding areas. In turn, this requires a spirit of détente based on the recognition that Europe must provide both sides, Ukraine and Russia, with security guarantees.
Finally, the third prerequisite is a readiness to be creative with issues of sovereignty and governance over disputed territories with a view to preventing the type of airtight partition left behind by the British Empire in India, Palestine, Cyprus, and Ireland, guaranteeing permanent conflict. Speaking of Ireland, the Good Friday agreement, a worthy effort to part ways both with the logic of strict partition and Westphalian sovereignty, is a splendid example of how the Donbas and other contested areas can be governed after the cessation of hostilities as part of a comprehensive peace and security pact.
Having stated the three prerequisites for a European pivot from forever war to offering Russia a peace and security pact, and before delving into what such a proposal might contain, the importance of rebuilding channels of communication with Russian society cannot be overestimated. The European Union’s policy of frowning upon, even sanctioning, anyone who dares maintain communication channels with Russian civil society is a form of self harm. This is why I accepted an invitation to address an investment conference in Moscow last week, one that involved no government representatives but did engage a large audience of financiers, technologists, students and journalists. If channels of communication are to be rebuilt, this is the type of audience that needs to get involved.
My visit to Moscow did not come out of the blue. In April 2022, two months after the war’s commencement, the movement that I helped co-found, DiEM25 (the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025), canvassed a five-point solution which I subsequently campaigned for, leading to the Athens Declaration on behalf of the Progressive International which called for a solution to the Ukrainian tragedy within the broader framework of a new Non-Aligned Movement. That was the background to my recent Moscow visit. Naturally, a Moscow visit by a former finance minister who failed spectacularly to alter Europe’s course a decade ago is not any kind of breakthrough, at least not in itself. However, what it can do is to demonstrate how Europeans can begin to mend fences with Russian civil society.
Screenshot of where I'm up to in the article with arrows showing that I'm only 50% of the way through and the word "HOW?" written in red. Send help.
Turning to the actual proposal for a comprehensive European peace and security agenda, which I went to Moscow to canvas for, it consists of six parts. First, Ukraine becomes in the 21st century what Austria used to be during the Cold War: a neutral but armed European country with its territorial integrity and political sovereignty jointly guaranteed by all European countries, plus Russia, under the auspices and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Second, the signatories of this Peace and Security Agenda shall agree on the gradual elimination across Europe of certain categories of weapons (including nuclear, chemical, and AI-powered drones). Within this context of deescalation, Russian and Ukrainian troops shall withdraw fully 300 kilometres on either side of the agreed border or line of control.
Map of Ukraine, with a line showing that Kyiv is 257km from the Russian border to the east.
Third, all war refugees will have the right to return to their pre-2014 homes, with all sides committing to aid their return in practice.
Fourth, the Donbas and other disputed territories that come under Russian control shall be demilitarised and governed in the same manner as Northern Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement. Just as London retained sovereignty on paper but, in practice, shares it with Dublin, while the two communities share power equally on every governing body (from local government to Stormont), the idea here is that sovereignty of the areas that Russia is granted will remain formally within Russia, but free movement within and outside these regions will be guaranteed, and each municipality as well as every Oblast will be governed on the basis of equal representation of Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers. Anyone who says that this is impossible must be reminded that, not long ago, it seemed similarly impossible to envision Sinn Féin and Ulster Unionists power-sharing.
Fifth, the European Union unfreezes Russia’s assets and removes all sanctions. Meanwhile Russian energy begins to flow again to Europe, with a portion of all proceeds dedicated to a Ukraine reconstruction fund.
Sixth, modelled on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established after the fall of apartheid to offer an opportunity to air grievances and to be heard by the opposite side, a similar council shall be convened by the UN, led by judges with experience in restorative justice from South Africa and other countries.
As wars and the fear of war expand their domain, an international push for peace is more pertinent than ever. An inability to imagine what a comprehensive European peace and security agenda would look like is perhaps the worst impediment to its emergence. The above six-point proposal is meant as an example of how to overcome this obstacle, outlining concrete steps Europe could take to break the deadlock and give itself a chance to become relevant again.
Many will ask: how would the Russian government, Vladimir Putin in particular, respond to such a proposal? While no one knows until it is on the table, my recent experience in Moscow tells me that Russian civil society is not only ready to welcome it enthusiastically but also to pressurise its government to take it seriously. Eager to reconnect with the West, but repulsed by the clear signs EU leaders want to see Russia torn apart by centrifugal forces, Russian public opinion is keen to enter into a fruitful dialogue on the basis of such a plan — including opponents as well as supporters of Putin’s government.
Last but not least, many of the Russian technocrats, students and journalists I met in Moscow last Saturday told me there was a reason they were more amenable to this particular proposal for a European peace and security agenda: it was put to them by someone whose stance on the Ukraine war four years ago (“Stand with Ukraine but not with Nato’s expansion”) was attacked with equal venom by the Russian government’s supporters and Nato stalwarts. This may help explain the impromptu party atmosphere, following the proposal’s presentation, to which I surrendered happily. Mending fences in the cause of peace takes a variety of small, human steps.

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