1/ The Russian Navy is in a perilous state of disrepair, Russian warbloggers warn in response to the news that repairs to the nuclear-powered battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy have been deemed impractical. Russia now has only one nuclear-powered cruiser and no aircraft carriers. ⬇️
2/ Laid down in 1986, Pyotr Velikiy has been laid-up in Severodvinsk since 2022. It is one of the surviving pair of the original four Kirov-class nuclear-powered battlecruisers (officially "heavy nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers"). The other is the Admiral Nakhimov. 3/ The decision has been made due to the high cost of modernisation, which has been deemed uneconomic at a time when Russia's military budget is under huge strain due to the war in Ukraine. 4/ According to TASS, the ship will be decommissioned after the completion of repairs to the Admiral Nakhimov. It has reportedly suffered severe wear and tear and obsolescence, while the budget will already be strained by the modernisation of the Admiral Nakhimov. 5/ 'Military Informant' notes: "Previously, it was also reported that repairs to the Project 1143 aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov had effectively ceased. The ship has been undergoing repairs since 2017, and recently, they have been virtually non-existent." 6/ "Thus, the Russian Navy is simultaneously losing its only aircraft carrier and one of its two nuclear-powered cruisers, with no replacements even in the medium term. 7/ "This means a complete break in continuity and a forced change to the entire concept of the Russian Navy's ocean-going fleet in the near future. Russian shipbuilders are no longer capable of quickly building new large ships, and the Russian budget can no longer afford them." 8/ The Russian destroyer Admiral Chabanenko also looks certain to be scrapped. It has been docked in Murmansk for repairs since 2013, but according to Ukrainian sources as of 2025, it appears the ship was in disrepair, and most if not all of its weapons systems had been removed.
9/ 'Kramnik's Cats' notes with dismay: "What's even worse is that the Chabanenko won't return either, apparently, despite the significant amount of work done on the ship." 10/ "It's best not to discuss the reasons, as they'll be written off as discredited, so let's assume everything is on schedule and perfectly correct." 11/ 'Honesty – and that's that' says that the ship's situation reflects "a systemic crisis in Russian military shipbuilding and the economy": "Building a replacement in the medium term is beyond the capabilities of the Russian defence budget and industry." 12/ "Change of concept: The simultaneous loss of flagships means a complete break in continuity. The Russian fleet will have to finally abandon the Soviet concept of a global ocean presence. 13/ "The ship, which was built to deter the ocean-going fleets of superpowers, ultimately lost to its main and most ruthless enemy – its own domestic situation. The ocean ambitions have finally been scrapped." 14/ 'Operational Line' suggests that the ship was a white elephant to begin with, and not worth the expenditure: 15/ "If the country found out just how much money had been poured into it in total, it would be moved to tears—even knowing full well that those decisions were made back when it had more than enough money for dubious projects, and largely not because they were practical,… 16/ …but simply to give the appearance of progress, not to actually achieve it." 'Ratio MiLitaris' comments that the circumstances of modern warfare make heavy battlecruisers – the largest warships afloat apart from aircraft carriers – obsolete in any case: 17/ "One might traditionally lament the loss of remnants of the Soviet era's military heritage, but the situation is actually much more complex and interesting: the conditions of modern warfare call into question the feasibility of many previous types of military equipment,… 18/ …and heavy missile cruisers are no exception. The issue is not only that, at this stage of military development, "armour versus projectile" is still won by the projectile, and large, expensive warships are too tempting targets for cheap flying and floating drones." 19/ The author argues that aerial, surface, and underwater drones have replaced the military needs for which the battlecruisers were developed. He suggests that Russia's experience in Ukraine make it well-equipped to adapt to the new maritime environment: 20/ "Times are changing, and the army and navy must change with them. Nuclear-powered missile cruisers, which became one of the symbols of the Soviet Union's military power during the Cold War, can no longer perform the tasks assigned to them with the same effectiveness, and… 21/ …these tasks themselves are gradually changing. And we absolutely should not cling to the past for purely nostalgic reasons, but should first and foremost think now about how to adapt to new conditions." /end Sources: 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me