1/ Russian attacks on Ukrainian data centres have started a "data centre war" for which Russia is ill-prepared, argues a Russian warblogger. He forecasts a disastrous collapse of Russia's digital economy if Ukraine's retaliatory attacks on Russian data centres continue. ⬇️
2/ In a long post, 'Artjockey' highlights how Ukraine has prepared for damage to its digital services, with the aid of its Western partners, while Russia seemingly has not. He blames officials for advising Putin to launch the attacks while overlooking Russia's own vulnerability: 3/ "This summer, faced with the inability to conclude a war that began nearly five years ago, Putin opted for a new round of escalation. 4/ "In June, the Russian Armed Forces began systematically targeting warehouses belonging to the Ukrainian company Nova Poshta, prompting a retaliatory strike on Wildberries warehouses; in September, strikes on Ukrainian data centres began, and a response followed swiftly. 5/ "In other words, one shouldn't assume that no one had thought to attack data centres before; it is simply that Putin decided to take this step right now. 6/ "This move effectively lifted the constraints that had previously bound Ukraine – a country that generally adheres to certain rules of engagement and, with few exceptions, does not initiate attacks on clearly civilian targets. 7/ "Ukraine had been prepared for this scenario almost from the very start of the war – and even before that. Even prior to the invasion, when it was clear to everyone that it was virtually inevitable, a law was passed allowing for the temporary storage of state registries abroad. 8/ "Immediately after the war began, Amazon allocated 10 petabytes of free cloud storage to Kyiv; data from registries, ministries, universities, and schools was migrated there, ensuring their operations never ceased. 9/ "Subsequently, Microsoft and European data centres also provided assistance to Ukraine. The protection of digital infrastructure was spearheaded by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, led by Mykhailo Fedorov — the very same person who, not long ago, briefly held the post… 10/ …of Minister of Defence. Consequently, since 2022, Ukrainian government services have either operated entirely from overseas cloud platforms or maintained redundant infrastructure there, allowing for an immediate switchover following an attack on the primary systems. 11/ "Private companies have followed suit; for instance, the telecom operator Datagroup – hit during the 25 September attack – announced that same day that customer data remained safe and all services continued running from backup sites with virtually no downtime.
12/ "This represents Ukraine's first major advantage: the country was prepared for such a scenario. Much of its infrastructure had already been deployed for years in locations beyond Russia's reach, supported by a legal framework that – while initially containing some… 13/ …limitations – facilitated this setup. Furthermore, Ukraine partnered with leading global IT firms – including the aforementioned AWS, as well as Google, Oracle, Microsoft, and others. Kyiv has access to these services, unlike Russia, which faces sanctions. 14/ "Ukraine's second advantage is the relatively small scale of its domestic physical IT infrastructure. While public data isn't available for every data centre – especially regarding the private infrastructure of specific companies – the information that is available… 15/ …provides a sufficient overview. The list of Ukraine's largest data centres includes facilities that have come under attack, such as PARKOVYI Data centre and De Novo. 16/ "The former has a capacity of 4 megawatts and houses 400 racks, while the latter has a capacity of approximately 3 megawatts and 360 racks; keep these figures in mind, along with the fact that these were among the country's largest facilities. 17/ "A third factor – difficult to verify independently but supported by expert opinion – is that the Ukrainian network is generally highly decentralised. There are no single major network hubs, an attack on which could bring down the "Ukrainian Internet." 18/ "While certain network segments or individual providers might go offline, they can be restored relatively quickly – as we have seen following previous attacks. Furthermore, Ukraine has access to Starlink, including enterprise-grade solutions that cluster terminals together… 19/ …to achieve data transmission speeds in the tens of gigabits. This is a viable option that could potentially restore connectivity – even for entire regions – in the event of major disruptions to the Ukrainian network." 20/ "The combination of these factors makes both the Ukrainian network and its IT infrastructure highly resilient to attacks. Russian drones might destroy equipment and cause temporary outages for specific services or providers, but they are unlikely to cause… 21/ …serious, widespread disruption. The damage from such attacks is primarily measured by the cost of the destroyed equipment, which remains relatively low due to the absence of massive data centres. 22/ "And this is far from the largest data centre; according to public data, the country’s largest is IXcellerate MOS5, featuring 5,000 racks and a power consumption of 64 megawatts. 23/ "The contrast is stark: a single data centre – not even the largest one targeted – is bigger than half of Ukraine’s top facilities combined. The second issue is the so-called "Cheburnet" (a sovereign, isolated Russian internet). 24/ "In its pursuit of a "sovereign internet," the government has effectively blocked Russian companies from using infrastructure even in friendly nations, while "unfriendly" countries have blocked access via sanctions anyway. 25/ "Due to restrictions imposed by Federal Laws No. 152-FZ and No. 187-FZ, it is virtually impossible to replicate Russian IT infrastructure in places like Belarus or Kazakhstan – though, in any case, the necessary capacity simply isn't there. 26/ "China might have the capacity, but that would require legislative changes to allow key services and registries to be moved there. 27/ "The third problem stems partly from the second and involves a high degree of centralization. This is driven partly by historical and geographical factors, and partly by the state's desire to control the entire internet "for the sake of security." 28/ "In August, we witnessed an outage – unrelated to the war – at the MMTS-9 exchange point, which also houses the infrastructure for MSK-IX, one of Russia's key internet exchange points. At that time, "half of RuNet went down" briefly.
29/ "That incident was caused by a power outage, but it immediately raised the question: "What would happen if a Ukrainian missile or drone struck the site?" 30/ "There is some good news, however — or at least factors that might stave off disaster for Russia for the time being: the majority of data centres are located in Moscow, protected by an air defence umbrella. 31/ "According to DC Market Insights, the capital accounts for 55 of the 100 data centres tracked, representing 70% of the total capacity. 32/ "Consequently, it would be difficult for Ukraine to inflict truly critical damage right now, although successful attacks on the Kapotnya oil refinery and Wildberries warehouses demonstrate that facilities in the Russian capital are not invulnerable. 33/ "Nevertheless, there are easier targets available to Ukraine for now: ▪️ Sberbank’s data centre in Balakovo, Saratov Region — 26 MW at launch and over 3,000 racks; one of the largest projects currently under construction in Russia; 34/ "▪️ Yandex in Kaluga – capacity exceeding 49 MW; ▪️ Yandex in Vladimir; ▪️ Rostelecom’s data centre in Udomlya – 4,000 racks. 35/ "Yandex appears to face the greatest risk right now; of its top five data centres, only one is located outside Moscow proper (in Mytishchi), while the others include the Sasovo facility (which is already out of operation), two phases in Vladimir, and the Kaluga site. bsky.app
🔥 Update from Yandex Data Center in Sasovo
36/ "It seems Ukraine could cripple Yandex’s operations by destroying more than half of its existing infrastructure. It might appear that Russian data centres have been built at a breakneck pace in recent years and that sufficient backup capacity exists… 37/ …for workload migration and distribution. This is the case, for instance, in the warehouse market: a surplus was built up prior to the war, and supply currently outstrips demand. However, the situation here is completely different: 38/ "▪️ In 2025, the website of the industry-specific DCAwards published a report stating that the infrastructure deficit in Moscow and St. Petersburg had reached a critical level, with data centre occupancy at 99%; 39/ "▪️ In late 2025, CNews reported on a market downturn, noting that the rate of new facility commissioning had dropped threefold; 40/ "▪️ Just a few days ago, Kommersant published an article on data centres reporting that demand continues to rise even as the pace of new capacity deployment slows. CNews presents the following chart:
41/ "At the aforementioned DCAwards, it was reported that only 500–600 server racks are available at any given time in the Moscow region; everything else is occupied. 42/ "One can conclude, then, that there is very little reserve capacity in Russia; a company like Yandex cannot simply rent idle data centre space from IXcellerate, as there isn't that much free infrastructure on the market. 43/ "Beyond the existing shortage, I suspect a scramble for available infrastructure began as early as yesterday morning; companies are likely snapping up available racks "just in case," aiming to create backups for at least their critical services. 44/ "Consequently, state regulation of the rack market — and even "server rationing" — is not a joke, but a distinct possibility. 45/ "It is crucial to understand that data centres are not merely about consumer internet access. Modern states and businesses rely on the network for their operations. 46/ "If the "Runet" or major cloud providers like Yandex were to go down, countless enterprises and government services would collapse with them; tax collection would cease, financial transactions would halt, and so on. 47/ "The issue is therefore extremely serious — far more so than the strikes on Wildberries, which result in economic damage but do not threaten the functioning of the state itself. 48/ "I believe Putin may have committed his second-biggest blunder since the invasion of Ukraine. He has literally started throwing stones inside a glass house without realizing how fragile that house is. The very system he built prevents him from grasping this;… 49/ …he makes decisions without consulting or listening to anyone, living in his own cozy bubble. 50/ "We saw this with the strikes on oil refineries: in Putin’s world, "only 10% of repairs remain," whereas in reality, the state is paying out record fuel price stabilisation subsidies for imports. 51/ "In Putin’s world, the strikes "didn't cause serious damage – just 1% of GDP" – yet in the real world, a loss of 1% of GDP is massive. 52/ "Putin also still fails to grasp that Ukraine’s capabilities have changed drastically, and that a war against a real enemy is not an exercise against a hypothetical adversary. Strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure might have made sense in 2022–2024,… 53/ …when Kyiv had no means to retaliate; however, initiating such an escalation in 2026 — when Ukrainian drones are torching oil refineries beyond the Urals, 3,000 km from the border – is sheer madness. 54/ "I suspect the Russian president is listening to generals who are either completely out of touch with reality or simply dim-witted; they advised him to attack Ukrainian data centres — a move that made no sense from the start. 55/ "He couldn't inflict any significant damage that way — everything had been moved to foreign cloud services back in 2022 (services Putin and his generals likely don't even understand) — but in doing so, he gave Ukraine a free hand. 56/ "A brilliant geostrategist, a master of 5D chess, who couldn't foresee the consequences more than a single day ahead. 57/ "I wonder what comes next? Will Russia start attacking Ukrainian nuclear power plants? 58/ "One wonders if Putin and Gerasimov will think to open a map of Russian nuclear plants beforehand and figure out how to protect the Rostov, Kursk, Balakovo, and Novovoronezh plants from retaliatory strikes. 59/ "The main question now isn't even about who inflicts more damage in terms of destroyed equipment or lost infrastructure capacity. What matters is how prepared both sides of the conflict are for scenarios involving strikes on data centres. 60/ "For years, Ukraine has consistently built "digital resilience" rather than "digital sovereignty" by migrating its infrastructure — critical and otherwise — to locations where it cannot be destroyed; we are now seeing the effectiveness of this strategy in practice. 61/ "Russia, conversely, initiated this escalation without fully considering the consequences, leaving itself potentially highly vulnerable with no quick fix available. 62/ "A single Ukrainian strike did not — and could not — collapse the entire Runet or even seriously disrupt Yandex’s operations; however, if this marks the start of a systematic campaign of strikes even half as successful as those targeting oil refineries and depots,… 63/ …the cumulative effect should become apparent quickly. The economics and consequences of a "data centre war" are entirely different — and, at first glance, Russia appears ill-prepared for them." /end Source: t.me