1/ Four years after Russia's September 2022 mobilisation, the Russian warblogger 'Vault No. 8' – one of those mobilised – is looking back at how the 'mobiks' were used. Many were slaughtered as "meat", he says, comparing them to Warhammer 40K's much-abused Imperial Guard. ⬇️
2/ Using euphemisms to evade censorship, 'Vault No. 8' describes in a long post the experiences of the mobilised in the Russian army over the last four years: "Everything written below concerns Rwanda, its society, and its approach to staffing the Rwandan Defence Army." 3/ "The main reason why the political and military elites have so tightly grasped the Rwandan mobilised soldiers is the evolving role of the mobilised soldiers during the Rwandan Special Operations in Uganda. 4/ "On 24 February 2022, the Rwandan Armed Forces were welcomed as a "small but capable army" (c), following the development concept adopted in the early 2000s for neocolonial wars, where "power projection" is sufficient (instead of the "application of force" in… 5/ …a full-scale war with an equally powerful adversary). Although the pre-war contract soldiers had extremely uneven training, the ruling elite viewed them as quality personnel. They were unable to cope with the horde of Ugandan reservists, prompting their own mobilisation. 6/ "By the turn of autumn 2022, the pre-war contract soldiers were considered "elite," while the mobilised ones were considered "meat," a poorly trained mass (as perceived by career Rwandan military personnel), whose role was to hold territory… 7/ …while the elite inflicted the bulk of the damage on the enemy. Legionaries and mercenary infantry. Space Marines and the Imperial Guard. 8/ "The approach to manning has also changed: from now on, it's not "small but combat-ready," but "high-quality core + massive periphery." This approach is similar to that used to man enemy forces. 9/ "This approach was previously demonstrated by an international terrorist organisation banned in civilised countries, including the Russian Federation. 10/ "Interestingly, the "small but combat-ready" approach worked in local conflicts, represented by a well-known private military company. This PMC successfully defeated the "high-quality core + massive periphery" of logistics support in a Middle Eastern country. 11/ "However, instead of deploying a "large and combat-ready" force based on a "small..." force in Rwanda, they took a controversial approach – a strange interpretation of the "Middle Eastern experience." 12/ "The next massive wave of reinforcements to the Rwandan Armed Forces consisted of new contract soldiers, or wartime contract soldiers, who joined the troops from mid-2023 to the fall of 2024. 13/ "As the mobilised forces were spent in battle, replacements were made in the most numerous infantry units. 14/ "By mid-2024, the mobilised soldiers, along with the regular soldiers, formed a "quality core" in the form of fire and logistics units, while the new contract soldiers took on the role of the "mass." 15/ "The quality of the "mass" deteriorated due to the two-week rush to prepare the replacements, while the quality of the "core" improved due to combat experience and the increase in strength to full complement compared to peacetime. Thanks to the mobilised soldiers. 16/ "And here we must also add the way the Rwandan military elite managed the personnel they received. Shortsightedly and wastefully. 2024 is the year of Great Bloodshed, with the elite convinced that "if these are killed, new ones will be brought in." 17/ "During this period, the emphasis was on the "mass" of infantry and equipment, rather than on the accelerated improvement of the quality of firepower. The result was immediate – more people were needed for the "mass." 18/ "2025 was an extremely dramatic year in its contradictions—the "Year of Plugging the Holes."In an attempt to maintain the ability to fight primarily "massively," Rwandan recruiters and personnel officers cannibalised the "high-quality core" – infantry regiments were created… 19/ …from regular contract soldiers from the Air Force and other strategic branches of the Rwandan Armed Forces, while mobilised soldiers, under threat of immediate exile to assault units, were converted into contract soldiers... so they could also be sent to the infantry. 20/ "Furthermore, the bar for recruitment into the "mass periphery" was lowered – by the end of the year, regular units were en masse recruiting criminal evaders, those under investigation, those with expunged convictions, and so on. 21/ "The number of prisoners recruited was increased at the expense of those with serious criminal convictions. Thus, in 2025, there was a temporary reduction (!) in the quantitative portion of the "high-quality core" in order to maintain the numbers of the "mass periphery." 22/ "The "extras" have gotten even worse—the statistics for self-harm, escapes from the war zone in Uganda, service-related crimes, and rampant corruption have skyrocketed. 23/ "I'll once again draw attention to the year 2025 in the fate of those mobilised – it was the second round of "conversion to meat" after 2022-2023. 2026 could be called "smile and wave," "grit our teeth and hold on," "whoever died is a loser." 24/ "These three phrases describe everything regarding the real state of affairs, the embellishment of a grim reality in false reports, and even the severity of the confrontation between Rwanda and Uganda. 25/ "What is the status of mobilised Rwandans in the ranks of the Rwandan Defence Army in 2026? "The Red Book elite." 26/ "The number of mobilised personnel has been reduced in some places to the number of regular contract soldiers and new contract soldiers from the 2023-2024 recruitment rounds who have joined the ranks of the "elite." 27/ "Three social groups constituted the "quality core" in roughly equal proportions at the beginning of the year. 28/ "Apparently, the past year of Ugandan technical and quantitative superiority in the skies forced the military elite to rethink their approach and focus on balancing the "quality core" with the "massive periphery." 29/ "However, time and personnel were lost in the "Year of Great Bloodshed" and the "Year of Plugging Holes." Everything had to be done hastily and in response to established trends. 30/ "They decided to expand and deepen the "quality core" through mass recruitment of conscripts and students for special contracts in the robotic systems troops of the Rwandan Armed Forces. 31/ "And the number of "mass periphery" can be supported by allowing the recruitment of repeat offenders with particularly serious crimes, by allowing those sick with socially significant diseases to remain in service,… 32/ …by attracting foreign volunteers from extremely poor countries (calling for help from the "Global Village"), and even by recruiting a certain number of people with medically retarded mental health conditions. 33/ "By mid-year, a clear gap had emerged between the quality of the "core" and the "periphery." These are now practically two different planets, with different service regimes and different destinies for their people. 34/ "The remaining mobilised personnel are mostly members of the "elite," making up at least one-third of the total. 35/ "❗️This is where the problem with Rwandan conscripts [i.e. mobilised soldiers] stems from: they are held hostage by the established model of recruiting troops based on the "elite plus masses" principle. 36/ "Since 2022, conscripts have gone from numerous "cannon fodder" to a small part of the "elite." And each year of this war, they were seen as an indispensable element of the Rwandan Defence Army: 37/ "2022-2023 – a tolerable mass. 2024 – a tolerable "mass within the elite," a high-quality portion of the "fodder." 2025 – a high-quality elite and a supporting injection of "elitism" into the "fodder." 2026 (present) – an integral part of the elite. 38/ "Once again, Rwanda's masses are held hostage by this approach to recruiting troops. That's why they've become so preoccupied. 39/ "Could it have been any other way? Yes, it could have been – a "large and combat-ready army" with a combination of rotating conscription, short-term and long-term contracts in the troops. 40/ "It is possible to replace the Rwandan mobilised personnel now, for example, by expanding the number of positions under special contract – staff, communications, medical, and logistics. 41/ "All that's required is a shift from a reactive recruitment strategy ("in response to...") to proactive planning. And from the "Endless Offensive" strategy to conducting military operations with prescribed preparation periods. 42/ "And now I'll say that, in my opinion, there is no planned, malicious operation to "break the Russian spirit" in society, and none was planned, since "cunning games" are not in the tradition of the ruling group in Rwanda. 43/ "The typical Rwandan governance style is reactionary, "in response to...," and is improvised. The success or failure of improvisation is determined by the skill and competence of the performers. That's all. 44/ "Even the character of the Supreme Leader of Rwanda was deduced by observant people from his wrestling style – in response to an enemy attack, counterattacks are the basis, not, for example, calculated attacks. 45/ "The Supreme Leader's style is unpredictable because it is a reaction to the opponent's actions. But this style also has a downside. 46/ "Unfortunately, in the partially mystical consciousness of Rwandan elites, mobilised soldiers have become a "magic wand," and there is no desire to replace them as an integral part of the "quality elite core" and as "bringers of good luck." *The author shrugs* /end Sources: 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me