1/ Even as Russian state propaganda hails Ukraine war veterans as heroes, Russia's security forces are reported to be quietly stepping up surveillance of a group that they regard as a growing threat. War veterans are already reportedly forming criminal networks. ⬇️
2/ During the 1990s, Afghan War veterans ('Afgantsy') became key participants in the explosion of crime that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many organised crime groups recruited Afghan veterans, and veterans were disproportionately represented in violent professions. 3/ Veteran identity, camaraderie, and access to violent skills made organized crime a viable career for some, but not most, veterans. They often maintained close ties with former comrades, creating ready-made trusted groups that criminal organisations could recruit together. 4/ Violent crime also rose in the aftermath of World War II, though this was more in the context of rural banditry, robbery, and black market activity. The Stalinist regime was more successful in suppressing it through its huge law enforcement and secret police apparatus. 5/ There have long been fears that returning Ukraine War veterans would cause a fresh explosion of violent crime. More Russians have fought in Ukraine than in Afghanistan, so the potential recruiment pool is already larger. 6/ An additional problem is that the Russian Army has been corrupted from top to bottom, as the thread below illustrates. It was already very corrupt but has recruited tens of thousands of convicts, including gangsters, into its ranks. bsky.app
1/ A huge cache of messages from the phone of Russian Major General Roman Demurchiev provides a unique insight into the inner workings of the Russian army. It reveals a force riven by feuds between generals, plagued by corruption, and full of contempt for superiors and peers. ⬇️
7/ As a result, military culture has now effectively taken second place to a criminal culture, in which those in positions of authority – whether senior or junior – often prey on their subordinates and everyone bribes their superiors. 8/ 'DShRG Rusych', a Telegram channel operated by a Russian neo-Nazi mercenary group with close links to the Russian security forces, says that "the security forces, for their part, view former SVO [Special Military Operation] participants as criminals." 9/ "There have been cases of veterans forming small criminal organisations (which is natural in a war without a quick, spectacular victory, but with drudgery and slavery). Because these veterans have learned to survive and gained combat experience, they act unconventionally. 10/ "According to our friends in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and other agencies), the system doesn't know how to deal with them and is unlikely to learn how anytime soon. 11/ "It's not as flexible as it was in 1945-46 and won't be able to quickly develop high-quality personnel capable of combating this. This is partly due to the lack of a state and national ideology, meaning that officers won't understand why they're doing this. 12/ "However, students at the Ministry of Internal Affairs' educational institutions are already being told that "SVO veterans will soon return and there will be a huge amount of work." 13/ "In other words, heroes and defenders of Russia who served time in the rear (sometimes even receiving the Order of Courage for Donetsk and Mariupol in 2023) are being elevated to the category of potential criminals. 14/ "And yet, they are still surprised by the attitude of former SVO participants toward a law enforcement system they distrust. 15/ "According to our information, intelligence and provocative activities will be conducted within informal associations of SVO veterans by law enforcement officers. Some officers of special agencies will be authorised to keep track of individuals returning from the SVO zone. 16/ "What will this look like? Essentially, a defined category of citizens will emerge, requiring special oversight. 17/ "Furthermore, if regulatory legal acts are drafted and adopted (currently being actively discussed at the Ministry of Internal Affairs Board), participation in the SVO will become an aggravating circumstance for a number of criminal offences. 8/ "It is still unclear how this will be presented to the public, but the media will begin to operate under the pretext of "this comrade is not our comrade." Accordingly, a specific media apparatus and tools will be assembled for this purpose (not preventative, but punitive). 19/ "The following are currently being discussed at meetings at the Ministry of Internal Affairs: 20/ "1. Intelligence activities within potential informal associations of SVO veterans. Given that SVO members are, unfortunately, still largely illiterate in digital and information hygiene, this will yield certain positive results if such activities are carried out. 21/ "2. Working with agents within these formations. The secret service will also recruit from former SVO members, who will be offered jobs in law enforcement agencies. 22/ "It's unclear what they will offer to people accustomed to salaries of 250,000 rubles, but some units will definitely be created for this purpose. 23/ "3. Developing a category of potential public danger based on specific criteria, including military occupational specialization, service in specific units, combat experience, and political and ideological views. 24/ "This concept has long been in existence. One reason UAV operators are now receiving certificates and registering for other similar records is the potential for numerous offences to be committed using unmanned systems. 25/ "However, the army's military registration system actually records no more than 40% of pilots. 26/ "4. Developing a supervision system. 5. Ideological outreach to specific individuals, specifically offering employment within the aforementioned structures [as a full-time or part-time employee] to oversee and organize preventative measures. 27/ "6. There are currently no methodological recommendations for preventative work. There are proposals for social integration and socialisation through transfers to public and administrative positions. 28/ "How this will be implemented is unknown. However, one suspects that at first it will resemble the Yunarmiya (Youth Army), which produces fictitious reports and has no real effectiveness. The important question here is who will oversee this. 29/ "7. The option of creating separate groups (departments within existing structures, such as the Center for Combating Extremism, the FSB, etc.) that could work in these areas is being considered." /end Source: t.me