1/ A massive new mobilisation in Russia this fall is increasingly being forecast by Russian warbloggers. They are, however, cautious about this prospect given the strains on the Russian economy and the chaos that accompanied the 2022 mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ 'DsHRG Rusich' comments: 3/ "We've already been mobilising (partially) since 2020. Another mass recruitment will most likely indeed happen, and it will probably happen after the Duma elections in September. Various crazy bans, internet restrictions, etc. are being prepared for this, among other things. 4/ "Is this good or bad? The mobilisation of, say, half a million men is not bad and will bring us closer to the so-called goals of the Special Military Operation, which is accelerating the liberation of Donbas territory within its administrative boundaries. 5/ "However, it's not the mobilisation itself that may be bad, but its execution. 1. The previous wave of mobilised soldiers, who have been fighting for four years, getting wounded and dying on the front lines, should ideally be sent home. 6/ "Holding them back under the pretext that they are already experienced fighters is nonsense. Everyone has their resources, and human resources are limited. Moreover, these people came involuntarily, and they have long since paid their debt to the Motherland. 7/ "2. The mobilisation will be carried out among the older generation, who, due to their age, are no longer capable of full-fledged combat. If anyone is to be mobilised, then young people aged 20-30 should be selected. 8/ "Firstly, this will give the young people excellent prospects; secondly, it will make the fighting force even younger than it is now. 9/ "3. The most important point is that mobilisation must take place with fully equipped personnel, and not like before, when we "have everything," and this "everything" is supplied by volunteers and humanitarian workers." 10/ The 'Multiplier' Telegram channel assesses the economic impact of a fresh mobilisation, and warns that it would severely stress an already heavily stressed economy and state budget: 11/ "Mobilisation isn't free. The state pays our citizens employed in the Special Military Operation zone. Let's assume the alarmists talking about 600,000 mobilised troops are right. 12/ "In that case, the direct costs will include salaries (based on current salaries, contract terms, and indexation, I'd estimate at 250,000 per month [per soldier]) plus uniforms and logistics. 13/ "Then we can roughly estimate a cost of 350-400 billion [$3.2-3.7 bn] rubles in the first month alone. And then there are salaries every month (and there are other payments, too). In the first year, that's easily +1.5 trillion rubles [$19 billion] in budget expenditures. 14/ "On top of that, there are indirect costs. People have left the economy, fewer available workers, higher inflation, and lower real tax revenues for the budget (which must be used to pay salaries). I'll focus on this specifically, as we have a labour shortage. 15/ "The economy is short of people, and removing hundreds of thousands of people from the economy (even temporarily) is costly. Indirect costs also include a certain political cost and other similar factors. This can't be done for free. 16/ "There will also be a parallel contract, which also includes signing bonuses (in some regions, millions). It will be more profitable for a potential mobilised person to sign it immediately or in advance, which, taking into account the signing bonuses, would roughly double… 17/ …the 1.5 trillion rubles above. Obviously, the budget will need additional funds for this undertaking. And the current situation in the global and domestic economies is more modest [i.e. fragile] than a couple of years ago. 18/ "We're already not accelerating the necessary borrowing (to cover the deficit and other needs) – the Ministry of Finance has already canceled OFZ [federal loan bond] auctions twice, and long-term OFZs have now increased in yield. 19/ "Can the budget find another 2-3-4 trillion rubles? Of course. But in the current conditions, this, coupled with the mobilisation factor, will lead to a revaluation of the entire money market, the key [interest] rate, the ruble, and stocks." /end Sources: 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me