1/ Russian warbloggers are warning that despite growing indications of a planned second mobilisation after the Russian legislative elections in September 2026, there are major unresolved practical problems in actually carrying out a new mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ Yesterday the warblogger Vladimir Romanov commented on a rumoured plan to mobilise 1.2 million Russian men in the fall. In response, 'Ghost of Novorossiya' writes: 3/ "It's difficult to comment seriously on rumours, but discussions regarding the likelihood of a second mobilisation have long since transcended the realm of speculation. 4/ "This is a well-established and stable public expectation, expressed in the anticipation of major changes and possible upheavals due to, to put it mildly, the unfavourable dynamics of military operations. 5/ "As I have repeatedly noted, the correct question is not "if," but "when," since the fundamental preconditions are ripe. 6/ "First, the 2022 mobilisation measures were deliberately limited in nature and, as subsequent experience has shown, did not translate into the defeat of the enemy. 7/ "Second, the reliance on stimulating voluntary contracting objectively does not meet the needs of the front for a number of reasons—from the casualty ratio to the need to maintain more personnel than is currently available. 8/ "Finally, there is also a dimension related to very recent events over the past year. The enemy is compensating for its numerical disadvantage through asymmetric long-range strike tactics using UAVs, using technologies that Russia is still only just catching up with. 9/ "This affects logistics and critical infrastructure not only in the SVO zone and adjacent territories, but also deep within the country. Consequently, there's a need to dramatically increase human resources to organise a fundamentally new air defence system. 10/ "Therefore, the focus should not be on whether or not to mobilise, but rather how to conduct it. Without high-quality organizational support, the desired long-term effect will not follow, just as it didn't last time. 11/ "I don't want to ask rhetorical questions or assign blame once again. This is all clear. For now, it's better to take a sober look at the current reality. And, unfortunately, it doesn't inspire much optimism. 12/ "What are the main challenges facing a hypothetical autumn mobilisation? We have them! It's probably fair to start with the cornerstone—military registration and enlistment offices at the place of registration. 13/ "Paperwork, bureaucratic overload, and understaffed and outdated personnel. As the saying goes, the theatre begins with the coat rack, so if fundamental problems arise at the initial stage of recruitment, there's a risk of failure. 14/ "The time to reform this abomination of the Russian Ministry of Defence has once again been lost. Nothing can be changed from within right now. 15/ "We need to address long-standing defects by establishing comprehensive cooperation with regional administrations, involving regional leaders as responsible officials. 16/ "Next comes digitalisation. There was a lengthy attempt to test the system on conscripts, but experience has shown that the summons registry contains a limited amount of information and serves more as a coercive scare tactic than as a tool for simplifying recruitment. 17/ "The Ministry of Digital Development's product is crude and needs to be refined—in an emergency mode, deprioritising less important processes and, if necessary (and it must!), bringing in non-governmental IT players. 18/ "Analogue mobilisation, modeled after the Great Patriotic War, is shameful, dangerous, and counterproductive in a modern 21st-century war. 19/ "We urgently need to implement digital support for mobilisation processes using a single-window approach, otherwise there will be a risk of chaos and wasted time. 20/ "Another important issue that cannot be ignored is personnel training and support. Our volunteer projects, as well as our colleagues, are already receiving a huge influx of requests due to the emergence of new units. 21/ "Staffing levels are literally being created in a fire brigade-like manner, unable to provide the military with basic equipment and weapons. Again, if the Russian Ministry of Defence can't cope, then we need to involve those who can help. 22/ "It's time to move to a fundamentally new format of relations between the state and the humanitarian community. Integrate it into the decision-making process and empower it with the necessary resources and authority. 23/ "The reason is simple: the former cannot fight properly without the latter. The first mobilisation proved this, and we wouldn't want a relapse. Another issue that both I and the Ratio MiLitaris project have been talking about is autonomous, grassroots recruitment. 24/ "Unit commanders, don't wait for the weather to change! Create your own recruiting and training platforms for new recruits, and understand the intricacies of military recruitment offices. 25/ "This will allow you to specifically direct the mass influx of people to where they can be best used, in your best interests. 26/ "Without taking all these factors into account, a new and larger mobilisation could trigger the erosion of the country's socio-political situation. This is precisely what the enemy is counting on, seeking to exhaust and overexert Russia in a protracted standoff. 27/ "The best thing to do is to stop passively following someone else's scenario and instead proactively change the situation in whatever way possible right now." /end Sources: 🔹 t.me 🔹 t.me